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One of Professor Magarian’s more impressive achievements in Managed 
Speech is paying the Roberts Court the compliment of providing a theory 
that runs through its various First Amendment cases.1 The book shows us 
surprising and hidden connections between disparate opinions by the 
Justices of the Court, and between different areas of First Amendment law. 
Importantly, the “managed speech” theory goes beyond just name-calling: 
“managed speech” is a coherent and even possibly defensible theory, not a 
label, like calling the Court “right-wing” or “pro-Business.”2 But there are 
some problems with Magarian’s approach. The first is that it works better 
for some areas of First Amendment law (government speech, campaign 
finance) than others—as Magarian himself might admit. A second problem 
is that Magarian’s alternative, “dynamic diversity,” is not as fully fleshed 
out as “managed speech,”3 so his book, in the end, operates more in the 
mode of diagnosis and critique rather than a positive blueprint for change. I 
will have something more to say about this in what follows.   
But it is a third problem I mostly want to focus on in my short essay in 
this Symposium. Dynamic diversity, like managed speech, operates at the 
level of theory, not at the level of constitutional doctrine. So while it may 
be clear what results in cases dynamic diversity would like, it is less clear 
what doctrinal route we should take to get to those results.4 In trying to 
figure out what route dynamic diversity could take, I make a partial—and 
somewhat half-hearted—defense of the Court’s so-called categorical 
                                                 
*  Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. Thanks to John Inazu, Will Baude, and Chris 
Lund for comments on an earlier, very rough draft, and to the participants and audience at the 
conference honoring Managed Speech. All errors are my own. 
1. See GREGORY P. MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH xv (2017) [hereinafter MANAGED SPEECH] 
(“I contend . . . that the Roberts Court’s free speech jurisprudence fits a descriptive template that I call 
managed speech.”).  
2. Id. By “theory” in this context I mean broadly something that seeks to explain and even to 
justify the various cases in this area.  
3. As discussed in Part II infra, “managed speech” is the idea that disruptive speech needs to be 
controlled, and the speech of powerful, established interests (whether governmental or private) should 
be privileged. “Dynamic diversity,” by contrast, favors the speech of “outsiders,” who oppose the status 
quo and lead to productive social and political change.  
4. As I explain later, this is related to dynamic diversity’s underdevelopment at the theoretical 
level.  













approach, developed in Stevens,5 Brown,6 and Alvarez,7 and about which 
Magarian seems ambivalent.8 I think there is a lot to be said for the 
categorical approach, and even its reliance on the perhaps malleable and 
certainly vague idea of “tradition.” Maybe the categorical approach is not 
our first choice or the choice for understanding the First Amendment. But it 
might just work as a second-best compromise in a lot of ways, and it may 
be the best way doctrinally to realize some of the goals of “dynamic 
diversity.”9 
My paper has three parts. In the first, I describe the appeal of the 
categorical approach, giving my own impressionistic view of where and 
why some people tend towards favoring First Amendment speech 
protections (including myself). In the second part, I try to list some of the 
problems with dynamic diversity. It is not only underdeveloped as a 
doctrinal matter—an objection I pursue more in the third part—but it is also 
strangely undermotivated as a theory. Stability has its appeal; less obvious 
is why disruption or social and political change as such are valuable. I also 
question whether dynamic diversity can support the results in Brown, 
Stevens, and Alvarez—which Magarian says he favors. In the third part, I 
turn more explicitly to doctrine and defend the categorical approach against 
some of Magarian’s brickbats.  
I. A HALF-HEARTED DEFENSE OF THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH10 
I find the First Amendment hard to love, unlike some of my students who 
have an ability to defend the thought they really do hate,11 up to and even 
sometimes beyond the point where that speech turns into incitement, causes 
harm, etc. My first instinct, instead, is to want to limit and maybe even 
                                                 
5. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
6. Brown v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
7. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
8. See infra Part I; see also MANAGED SPEECH, supra note 1, at 11 (categorical approach cases 
make “serious contributions to constitutional speech protection”); id. at 252.  
9. A brief word about what I mean by “doctrine” here. In contrast to theory, which seeks at an 
abstract level to describe and justify certain Supreme Court cases, “doctrine” is a method by which that 
theory can be realized in particular cases, by saying how the Court should rule and what moves it should 
make, etc. in those cases.  
10. For a comparatively early look at the Courts’ use of categorization in the First Amendment 
context, see Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2009). 
11. “[I]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment 
than any other it is the principle of free thought—not free thought for those who agree with us but 















suppress the thought that I hate—racist speech, sexist speech, hate speech 
of all sorts. Of course, I do not want to do that at all costs, but I do want to 
do it (and I find a little mysterious those who do not cop to having this desire 
even a little). Why should my initial impulse be to protect thought that I 
view as not only wrong, but also badly wrong and harmfully wrong? I do 
not support an unregulated market in goods; why should I want to defend 
one in ideas? 
But then I end up backing into the First Amendment’s protections 
through a familiar and well-traveled route. Sure, I want to limit those ideas 
that I find hateful, and if I were king of the world and if I were sure I were 
infallible, then I would limit them. But I am not king of the world, and I am 
not always right. So the First Amendment ends up for me as at least a 
pragmatic ideal. I will accept the compromise that I do not get to suppress 
my disfavored ideas (about which I might be mistaken) so long as you 
accept the deal, too. Out of this grudging abstinence, the virtue of tolerance 
and acceptance may be born. I learn to put up with you, and may find you 
are not all that bad, despite the terrible things you say. I might even someday 
find myself being persuaded by you: a possibility that would have never 
come about had I suppressed your ideas. This sort of tolerance and 
acceptance is not the main reason for protecting your speech, though. I 
really do doubt in most instances that I will be persuaded by your speech or 
think that there is something especially valuable in your autonomously 
being badly wrong. 
Consider how this plays out in two cases, Stevens and Brown. I am one 
of those who probably would find nothing redeeming in even the material 
that falls under the (overbroad) law of Stevens, a case that involved a law 
designed to curtail the circulation of depictions of animal cruelty. What 
contribution to public debate do “crush videos” or films of dogs mauling 
one another provide? Should they even be considered a type of speech? I 
don’t really understand why people would watch these things—I don’t even 
understand why people would want to watch bullfighting (live or taped), or 
a documentary on pit bulls.12 Or take violent video games, the subject of 
regulation in the Brown case: some of these are now much more graphic, 
much more explicit than even the ones discussed by Justice Alito in his 
concurring opinion. One which I was exposed to (although my memory is 
fuzzy) involves your character violently vomiting on everybody, and then 
somehow also dismembering them, urinating on them, and doing all of this 
                                                 
12. Although I might support efforts to secretly videotape what is going on at dairy farms. See 
the recent case, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018). 













in a vaguely racist and homophobic way.13 What is the good that comes 
from people playing these video games? And, I mean this not just as relates 
to the risk that these video games will cause people to be more violent; I just 
worry about the general coarsening of sensibilities that comes from being 
around these things.14 I don’t think I am alone in reacting in this way. So 
when I read about legislation that tries to restrict animal cruelty videos and 
violent video games, my first impulse is not that we should fight to the death 
to protect views that we loathe, and which may even be “fraught with 
death.”15 My first impulse is to ask, “Well, why not try to shut these things 
down?” 
The answer to “why not?” comes in Justice Roberts’s response to the 
approach favored by the government in Stevens: where and how do you 
draw the line? The government says the values here (preventing cruelty to 
animals; protecting kids from images of violence) outweigh protecting the 
speech that is at issue—but who decides which values are relevant and how 
to balance those values? Thatresults in a sort of “free-floating test” 
(Roberts’ phrase), which invites all sorts of subjectivity and bias into the 
analysis.16 What we need—and what Roberts gives us—is something that 
says: look, here is a brake on the sort of free form analysis we might be 
tempted to do. It is a list of those things we have “traditionally” said get no 
protection from speech. It is a relatively short list, but it is exhaustive, as far 
                                                 
13. I may be misremembering some details, but the game Postal 2 does come close. See John 
Herrman, No, Let’s Talk About Video Game Violence, BUZZFEED (Dec. 17, 2012, 4:46 PM), https://www 
.buzzfeed.com/jwherrman/no-lets-talk-about-video-game-violence [perma.cc/T47C-P5RM]. 
14. See Laura Miller, How Video Games Change Us, SLATE (Nov. 30, 2016), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/culturebox/2016/11/do_video_games_make_us_more_cruel.html 
[perma.cc/UGC2-BGKB]. 
15. “[W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that 
we loathe and believe to be fraught with death . . . .” Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting). 
16. The relevant quote from Stevens is this: 
The Government thus proposes that a claim of categorical exclusion should be considered under a 
simple balancing test: “Whether a given category of speech enjoys First Amendment protection 
depends upon a categorical balancing of the value of the speech against its societal costs.”  
Unites States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (citing Brief for United States 8); see also 
id., at 12. 
As a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage, that sentence is startling and dangerous. The 
First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that 
survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself 
reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the 
Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that 
judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it. The Constitution is not a 
document “prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure.”  
Unites States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 














as we know. And the thing the government wants to prohibit, depictions of 
animal cruelty, is not on the list. Justice Scalia does the same thing in Brown. 
Here is this list of things we can ban, Scalia says, and the thing you want to 
ban isn’t on it.17 The result is garbled in Stevens (because the case was 
decided on other grounds), clearer in Brown, and muddled again in Alvarez 
(because there was no majority), but the idea is the same. The list dictates 
what kinds of speech the government can regulate and even ban, and if the 
thing isn’t on the list, the government does not just get a free hand (or “free-
floating power”18) in regulating it. End of discussion, pretty much. 
But does it not matter what the list has on it? How did we decide to use 
this list? Does not the list itself have to be interpreted? All of these are 
important questions, and I will get to them in the Part III. But the list of 
categorical exceptions to First Amendment protection (hence the name, the 
“categorical approach”) has the right kind of feel to it—it’s purported 
objectivity and straightforward application fills the right kind of space—
especially as Justice Roberts defines it. It opposes itself to the idea that we 
can just do free-form balancing to decide speech questions. That involves 
too much subjectivity. If we can point to a list, a list to which categories 
cannot be added (but from which categories could possibly be subtracted), 
that puts the appropriate kind of brake on the temptation to limit the kind of 
speech we do not like—because next time, it may be our ox that is gored. 
II. DYNAMIC DIVERSITY 
How does dynamic diversity—Magarian’s counter-theory to “managed 
speech”—deal with all this? That is, how does it rein in the inevitable 
temptation to suppress speech the government does not` like? The answer 
is unclear, because dynamic diversity is underdeveloped in two respects. 
First, dynamic diversity is not doctrine. It operates, or seems to operate, in 
the same conceptual space as managed speech. It is a theory about speech 
and the regulation of speech.19 “Dynamic diversity” does not and cannot tell 
courts, at least not directly, how they should decide cases. The Court cannot 
rule on a case and say, “we strike down this law because it harms dynamic 
diversity,” any more than it can say, “We uphold this law because it 
manages speech.” So we have to engage in a sort of translation to see what 
                                                 
17. See Part II of the Brown opinion. Brown v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 790–99 
(2011).  
18. Id. at 794 (Scalia, J.).  
19. Magarian says the theory is only “descriptive” in the case of managed speech, but I think his 
analysis belies this claim—I think it may operate prescriptively as well. Dynamic diversity is, by 
contrast, a normative aspiration, and does not describe much current Court doctrine.  













dynamic diversity means as a matter of constitutional doctrine. But there is 
a second way in which dynamic diversity is underdeveloped. It is not 
obvious why dynamic diversity is really all that valuable, and Magarian 
never really tells us in too much detail why it is. I know that Magarian thinks 
that stability (or at least the “aggressive preservation” of stability20) can be 
bad, but it does not follow that dynamic diversity is always good. Is political 
and social change as such good? Most agree it is not when we change from 
democracy to fascism. Nor is it good when that change leads to greater 
economic inequality and depression. Change is good when we have been 
going in the wrong direction, of course, but I think Magarian does not want 
to claim that dynamic diversity is only good when it leads to good things—
that is a rather small circle (dynamic diversity is good when it is good, bad 
when it is bad). Moreover, it is not clear why we should only favor dynamic 
diversity when it comes to freedom of speech, as opposed to supporting in 
when it results in legislative action as well. Could it not be a part of 
“dynamic diversity” that we pass new laws that represent new and 
democratically-arrived-at approaches to problems? Isn’t this also an 
example of disrupting the status quo?  
Let me start with the doctrinal point first. Dynamic diversity does not 
directly say how the Court should decide cases. Dynamic diversity favors 
certain results—it likes it when outsiders and outsider speech wins. It likes 
when minority speech interests are protected, and not the interests of the 
government and large corporations. But again, we cannot decide cases on 
this basis; I do not think—we cannot just say, “Well, of the two sides here, 
this side is the little guy, and the other side is the big guy. The little guy 
wins.” We have to say—I think this is not too controversial—why text, 
history, and precedent should lead to that result. We have to have some 
principled way of telling the good speech from the bad speech, one that is 
in some respect independent of our preferences from moment to moment. 
And when values are at play, we have say what those values are, and more 
importantly to specify in each case why these values apply and how to weigh 
those values against one another. To be sure, Magarian comes close to 
laying out a doctrinal method for dynamic diversity when he writes that 
instead of relying on a categorical list, courts should just go directly to a 
balancing of the interests at play. Dynamic diversity, he says, “take[s] a 
functional, substantive approach to categorical First Amendment questions, 
asking whether excluding a given category of speech from First Amendment 
protection would promote a diversity of ideas and participants in public 
                                                 














debate.”21 “The most transparent way for the Court to decide categorical 
exclusion cases,” Magarian adds, “would be to talk openly about which 
values matter and why.” The categorical approach, by contrast, “hides the 
analytic ball” by pretending to not make value choices when it actually and 
implicitly does. 22 I think that is a fair criticism of the categorical approach, 
and I will try to defend the approach against it in Part Three, because the 
question here may be less whether the categorical approach avoids all 
controversial value choices, and more about whether it does a better job of 
this than any other approach, dynamic diversity included.. 
For Magarian’s own position sounds worryingly like the free-floating 
balancing test that Roberts declaims in Stevens.23 It tells us to go straight to 
the weighing of values, where there seems to be little in the way given in 
guiding us how to do this, consistently, from case to case. “Dynamic 
diversity,” in fact, looks a lot like the approach favored by Justice Breyer in 
his dissent in Brown and his concurring opinion in Alvarez.24 We look at the 
values and we weigh them, and we come up with the answer. But in Brown, 
Breyer’s balancing comes out the wrong way—at least according to 
Magarian, who favors the result reached by the majority—and I wonder 
where Magarian would object, or find fault. This is the problem when the 
command is simply to “weigh the values and get the answer.” What if we 
weigh the values differently, as Breyer and Magarian do? If that’s the case, 
then we need to understand why one side is right and the other is wrong.  
So if Breyer gets it wrong, how does he get it wrong? Is it that Breyer 
misunderstood the value and significance of the speech at hand? I doubt it. 
I imagine the majority of people would agree the speech is pretty worthless, 
                                                 
21. MANAGED SPEECH, supra note 1, at 31. 
22. Id. at 16.  
23. And—we might worry—makes the Supreme Court a much more active manager of speech 
than it is with the categorical approach. I won’t push this objection, though, as the Court’s role in all of 
this seems inevitable. 
24. See MANAGED SPEECH, supra note 1, at 28 (stating that Breyer in Alvarez is “all about” using 
a “more flexible balancing analysis”). The clearest statement of Breyer’s method comes in his concurring 
opinion in Alvarez (although Breyer also describes and employs this method in Brown): 
In determining whether a statute violates the First Amendment, this Court has often found it 
appropriate to examine the fit between statutory ends and means. In doing so, it has examined 
speech-related harms, justifications, and potential alternatives. In particular, it has taken 
account of the seriousness of the speech-related harm the provision will likely cause, the nature 
and importance of the provision's countervailing objectives, the extent to which the provision 
will tend to achieve those objectives, and whether there are other, less restrictive ways of doing 
so. Ultimately the Court has had to determine whether the statute works speech-related harm 
that is out of proportion to its justifications. 
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 













pointless, and even scary.25 Did Breyer misconstrue the value of the 
disruptive speech—of this disruptive speech? But how disruptive is the 
speech here? Or how much does violent speech—dismayingly—represent 
the status quo in most of contemporary entertainment? Are there not enough 
people standing up for (virtually) vomiting and urinating on people? Do we 
need more? Or is Breyer not standing up for the little guy? But who is the 
little guy here?26 It’s not the major media companies, i.e., the people who 
sell the video games—even Magarian seems to agree with this. The little 
guy in this case might be the parents who want to try to protect their sons 
and daughters from images of slaughter and cruelty; and even the children 
themselves, who may have interests that need protecting.27 How, precisely, 
is this balancing supposed to go so that the video game companies obviously 
win? Is it just that censorship is always bad? But is it?28 If dynamic diversity 
in the end becomes just an opposition to regulation of any speech, it 
becomes less interesting: it does not tell us why any law suppressing speech 
in any given case should be void. 
For dynamic diversity to be useful, it has to tell us when diversity is 
present, and why it is valuable in particular cases. As things stand, it is too 
fuzzy to be applied in deciding cases; it is more of an opposing stance to 
managed diversity rather a fully-worked out doctrine. I would want to hear 
more about how Magarian would employ the theory of dynamic diversity to 
the facts in Brown, and how he would respond to Breyer’s dissent in that 
case.29 The categorical approach, which is also still probably theoretically 
                                                 
25. Magarian at one point calls it “arguably frivolous.” MANAGED SPEECH, supra note 1, at 11. 
Some might worry too about the especially interactive nature of the violence because of a potential 
antisocial impact it could have on the user’s behavior (as Alito does in his concurring opinion). See also 
Michael McConnell, A Free Speech Year at the Court, FIRST THINGS (Oct. 2011), https://www.first 
things.com/article/2011/10/a-free-speech-year-at-the-court [http://perma.cc/797X-FNUH] (“Moreover, 
video games are not, in fact, the same phenomena as books, movies, or comic books. The gamer is not 
just ‘exposed’ to ‘ideas,’ he engages in conduct that simulates murder, rape, brutality, and torture. If 
virtue ethics has any experiential validity at all, repeated conduct over a period of time has an effect on 
human character.”).  
26. The issue is hard on both sides. Magarian says Stevens and Brown both favor commercial 
interests. I think this exaggerates, and also overstates the similarities between varied commercial 
enterprises. In other words, it’s not obvious to me that the Court in these cases really is favoring just 
“the big guy.” (What about the small-time, hunting video salesperson? Or the video game startup?) For 
reflections on a related problem in the campaign finance context, see Chad Flanders, Super PACs and 
Politics of the Weird, POLITICO (Mar. 6, 2012), https://www.politico.com/story/2012/03/super-pacs-
unleash-politics-of-the-weird-073679 [perma.cc/76ME-ZZKV]. 
27. In Stevens, it might be the animal rights activists working against depictions of animal cruelty 
who are the “little guys.”  
28. And, in the end, what is the offensive idea here: the “speech” of the violent video games, or 
the idea that such speech should be modestly regulated?  
29. Cf. William Baude, Should Free Speech Doctrine Use “Purely Historical Tests”?, WASH. 














underdeveloped, gives us cleaner answers: in Brown, violent speech isn’t on 
the list, so the law goes down. The categorical approach, as a theory anyway, 
lends itself to a simple, even simplistic analysis: is the category of speech 
on the list, or not? But maybe the problem of doctrinal translation points to 
something else, something deeper, which is that dynamic diversity as a 
theory is itself too fuzzy. According to Magarian, dynamic diversity is 
valuable because it promotes open speech and debate, and this can lead to 
social change.30 I have already, in passing above, questioned whether social 
change as such is a good thing.31 If things are going well, stability is good. 
And it cannot be that everything is up for grabs (as Magarian himself 
admits). There has to be some stability, some constraints on who can say 
what, when, or else we have a cacophony of voices, where no one gets 
heard—this is as true when it comes to speech in particular as it is for 
governance in general. Robert Post has put this paradox well, and I can’t 
improve on him here.32 What I want from Magarian is why he sees sheer 
variety in democratic discourse as valuable; and in his theory of dynamic 
diversity, I do not see it, or I do not see enough of why it is good.  
But let me push this one step further and suggest that maybe dynamic 
diversity really supports the opposite result in Stevens and Brown, cases 
Magarian says were decided rightly, even if for the wrong reasons. The laws 
in Stevens and Brown were attempts at social change—and even against 
                                                 
should-free-speech-doctrine-use-purely-historical-tests/ [perma.cc/NV6V-2QPV] (“I highly doubt that 
if asked to consider the ‘value’ and ‘costs’ of the speech itself—divorced from the historical rules of 
free speech—that most of them would vote in favor of dog-fighting videos, hateful funeral protests, or 
violent video games in the hands of children. That suggests that cases like Stevens actually function to 
express a value judgment of their own—that judges should faithfully implement constitutional law rather 
than making it according to their will. It seems to me our constitutional doctrine needs more of that, not 
less.”). 
30. MANAGED SPEECH, supra note 1, at xvii (“[T]he underlying reason for wanting as many 
people . . . to engage in public debate about as many ideas as possible, posits free speech as an engine 
of political and social change.”); see also id. at 242 (“Dynamic diversity views the capacity of speech to 
foster social and political change as central to the constitutional value of free expression.”); id. at 243 
(citing dynamic diversity’s “vision of a First Amendment that enables social and political change”); id. 
at 253. One might wonder about this as an empirical matter as well—is free and open speech the best 
vehicle for social change? Maybe a lot of political and social change comes about when a limited number 
of people govern the conversation, not when it is open to “all comers” (who may debate and debate, but 
get nothing resolved). Or, more modestly, we might wonder whether we always need the widest possible 
range of speakers and views in order for there to be “dynamic diversity.” Cf. MANAGED SPEECH, supra 
note 1, at 233 (noting the empirical question of whether managed speech promotes stability).  
31. As Magarian allows: “Change is not an absolute good; societies need stable institutions.” Id. 
at xviii.  
32. See Robert C. Post, Between Democracy and Community: The Constitution of Social Form, 
in Democratic Community: Nomos XXXV 163, 164 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993). 













some pretty powerful interests:33 the video game industry in Brown and 
possibly the hunting lobby and the NRA in Stevens.34 They wanted to make 
a change, even a “dynamic” change, to the terms of the status quo, by 
limiting the ability of kids to buy violent games and for people to consume 
depictions of animal cruelty. There was proposed reform, presumably as the 
result of some degree of debate and dialogue, in one case by Congress and 
in the other case by the California Assembly. Why is dynamic diversity only 
good when we are debating change, but not also when we actually also 
implement that change through actually passing laws and changing the 
status quo?35 Why, in other words, favor the vehicle of social change but 
prohibit the result?36 And in fact, that is what Brown did.37 Nor would the 
existence of the laws prevent further debate—of an undeniably political and 
undeniably valuable kind—about the wisdom of those laws. Maybe violent 
video games really represent a sort of safety valve on actual violence, and 
so kids should have this outlet; who knows? Maybe having an overbroad 
law against hunting videos chills speech that really works to help promote 
gun safety. And so on and so on. Passing the laws in Brown and Stevens 
does not stop debate and may even spur it.38 Why isn’t this a win for 
dynamic diversity—and for social change of a positive sort? 
III. DEFENDING THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH MORE FORMALLY (AND A 
LITTLE LESS HALF-HEARTEDLY) 
In Part I, I did not give a defense of the categorical approach so much as 
a description of why I found it somewhat congenial—it checked my impulse 
to repress speech I did not like with the recognition that having a free-
                                                 
33. We might note, too, that these laws (almost by definition) challenge the status quo—in which 
people can sell animal cruelty videos, and children can buy violent video games.  
34. The NRA filed a brief on behalf of Stevens. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Rifle America, 
Inc. in Support of Respondent, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (No. 08-769), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_07_
08_08_769_RespondentAmCuNRA.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/8F4P-88GE]. 
35. One answer Magarian gives in his book is that speech is relatively harmless. But there are 
harms to not acting, and those harms—I think—are plausibly construed as harms to sometimes desirable 
social and political change. 
36. Compare Kant’s description of Frederick the Great:  
But only the man who is himself enlightened, who is not afraid of shadows, and who commands at 
the same time a well disciplined and numerous army as guarantor of public peace—only he can 
say what [the sovereign of] a free state cannot dare to say: ‘Argue as much as you like, and 
about what you like, but obey!’ 
Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, (September 30, 1784). 
37. See McConnell, supra note 25 (“The majority effectively closes off any prospect of 
regulation.” (discussing the effect of Brown)).  














floating power to repress speech might not be so great in the wrong hands. 
And in Part II, I did not defend the categorical approach; I attacked 
Magarian’s position as being both doctrinally and theoretically 
underdeveloped. So in this Part, I need to come to the defense of the 
categorical approach more directly. But I should add that in this case the 
best defense is a good offense. One does not pick the categorical approach 
as a first best option. One more or less backs into it; at least, that is what I 
did. And one sticks with the categorical approach because the other options 
are not much better; again, one does not so much champion the categorical 
approach as settle for it. 
We do have to answer some basic questions about that approach. The list 
of categories of speech, Magarian says, seems problematic, because we do 
not quite know why these things are on the list and others are not. This is 
either a blind obeisance to tradition, or it is an example of previous act of 
balancing—the latter of which is in fact explicitly suggested by the famous 
passage in Chaplinsky39 and taken as an invitation in Ferber.40 I will get to 
the tradition point in a bit, but I think the way the Roberts Court has 
construed the list is that it is limited and fixed. Moreover, it is a descriptive 
list. The list should not be read as a kind of formula—hence the importance 
in Stevens of reinterpreting Ferber (while somewhat of a stretch) as a case 
involving crime facilitating speech and not as the creation of a new 
category.41 Items on the list have to have a certain, very particular historical 
pedigree, which means that it is not very likely that any new items can be 
added to the list. At one point, maybe there was balancing, but, purportedly, 
that is not what courts should do now. The balancing has been done; the list 
remains. The categories purportedly have been set. Just like one cannot have 
new old friends, one cannot have a new old tradition.  
But this just raises the stakes for the tradition objection. Why should we 
accept the list if it is only tradition that gives the list its imprimatur? Part of 
me finds this objection a little odd. Courts are all about “tradition.” That’s 
what precedent is.42 The Constitution is an old text, surrounded by history 
and tradition. Courts have to work within that “tradition”—that is what 
                                                 
39. The relevant passage from Chaplinsky states: 
It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and 
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them 
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) 
40. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754 (1982). 
41. I agree with Magarian that Ferber is best read as creating a new category of disfavored 
speech. See MANAGED SPEECH, supra note 1, at 6.  
42. See generally Anthony Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 Yale L.J. 1029 (1990). 













constrains them, at least in part, and prevents them from becoming “naked 
power organs,” in Herbert Weschler’s phrase.43 “Tradition” is one very 
important kind of limiting thing that people assume is independent of our 
present-day values and wishes; and it certainly does not always align with 
them. Magarian is right that even tradition needs to be interpreted, and that 
“tradition” can be subject to different interpretations and can be 
manipulated.44 Sure. But I do not think that tradition is infinitely malleable. 
History, when presented (ideally) by a neutral, disinterested party, at least 
presents itself as something out of our control that can surprise us, and 
constrain us—and act as a check on our wills.45 It is something that we do 
not decide but have to look for.46 Can we differ about history? Of course. 
But does that mean everything is fair game? I don’t think so. Tradition 
seems more constraining than a direct appeal to values, going straight to 
balancing.47 Justice Roberts is right: that is free-wheeling.48 
Moreover, Magarian ignores something else about tradition: that we have 
a tradition of freedom of speech. We have to read the categorical approach 
in light of this tradition, too, and I think that is what Roberts does. The 
tradition of freedom of speech in part explains why the list of unprotected 
categories is not open-ended; it tells us to interpret the list as not really one 
that can grow, not something that we can add to in the present. It is only 
something that we can discover we had been doing all along, by doing the 
historical research necessary to find that tradition. So one broader tradition 
(that of U.S. freedom of speech) informs another (the fixed and limited 
nature of the list of categorical exclusions). It is a tradition that we exclude 
certain categories of speech, but it is also a tradition that we have "a 
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
                                                 
43. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
12 (1959).  
44. Magarian is especially worried that we might find “new” categories of speech excluded from 
First Amendment protection. MANAGED SPEECH, supra note 1, at 16.  
45. See Baude, supra note 29; see also Blocher, supra note 10, at 382 (“The creation of the 
category cuts off future adjudicators from the underlying value and prohibits the reweighing of 
interests.”).  
46. Magarian makes this point—indirectly—by citing places where Scalia and Alito got the 
history wrong in Brown. See MANAGED SPEECH, supra note 1, at 13–14. By making historical claims, 
Scalia and Alito open themselves to criticism, which shows the way in which history really is an 
independent standard. We can’t just make it up.  
47. And the competence question is a wash. Are courts better at “history” or better at assessing 
“which values matter” (and to whom)?  
48. Related to this defense of tradition is a defense of the idea that simple rules are better than 
complex rules. But the two ideas are distinct. One might have a complicated tradition, or one might have 
a simple one (as with the tradition of the categorical exclusions, at least as described by Justice Roberts). 















should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”49 In fact, I think it is this 
tradition that has helped “whittle”50 down and even eliminate some of the 
categories—incitement, fighting words, profanity—that were thought to be 
subject to no First Amendment protection. Tradition is not conservative, or 
inherently conservative. It is going to depend on, in part, to what tradition 
we are harkening back.51 In fact, the influence of our longstanding free 
speech tradition suggests a sort of “one way ratchet” when it comes to the 
traditional categories: we cannot add to the list, but we can subtract from 
it.52   
Magarian, I know, objects to some of the traditional categories in the list 
provided by Roberts, Scalia, and Kennedy (the list of course has some 
interesting and strange variations53). He objects especially to the categorical 
exclusion of obscenity from First Amendment protection.54 I am less 
worried about this, partly because obscenity does not seem all that valuable, 
especially if interpreted to include what Catharine MacKinnon and others 
have articulated as “pornography.”55 It also strikes me that the Miller test, 
interpreted aright, gives communities a way to slowly increase the tolerance 
they allow to certain forms of obscenity.56 I am not saying that there are not 
problems here. At the same time, that the list of “traditional” categories is 
not perfect is not a reason to reject the categorical approach wholesale. For 
one, the list is the list we have because the history is history we have (if it 
isn’t, then this would be the basis for only an internal objection to the list57). 
If history is to operate as an effective constraint, at some point we will just 
have to accept the history we have, even if it isn’t the history we would, 
ideally, want to have. For another, the list seems mostly OK.58 
                                                 
49. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).  
50. MANAGED SPEECH, supra note 1, at 5. 
51. One might here invoke the United States’ revolutionary tradition as against Edmund Burke’s 
understanding of French tradition in his Reflections on the Revolution in France. EDMUND BURKE, 
REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (1790).  
52. And in fact, this seems to be how tradition works. Traditions can die, but you can’t create a 
new tradition just like that.  
53. One key difference seems to be whether child pornography is a separate item, or is subsumed 
under crime-facilitating speech.  
54. MANAGED SPEECH, supra note 1, at 14.  
55. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, 20 HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. 
REV. 1 (1985). 
56. See the discussion of Miller in MAGARIAN¸ supra note 1, at 5.  
57. In other words, one would be accepting that history fixes what categorical exclusions there 
are, but that his or her version of history differs.  
58. I find nothing wrong with the law that criminalizes animal fetish videos, for example—a 
“fix” to the statute at issue in Stevens. See United States v. Richards, 755 F.3d 269, 271 (5th Cir. 2014). 
At the same time, there are serious problems with applying Miller in the age of the internet, some of 
which Magarian notes in his book.  













But at the end of the day, one question for the opponent of the categorical 
approach has to be: what do you have that is better? What can do the same 
work that tradition in the hands of the Roberts Court does? If we go to 
values, whose values get to decide cases—and why these values? Tradition 
may not be the right thing to do the work of protecting speech, but I hope to 
have shown it is at least the right kind of thing. It constrains the Court from 
ad hoc balancing to determine which categories of speech are protected and 
which are not. And it seems to give the right results, at least if we are 
generally worried about government restrictions on speech (as I am, for the 
pragmatic reasons I articulated in Part I). Moreover, tradition is not exactly 
an alien thing when we are trying to determine the meaning and contours of 
the Constitution. Again, what else can really check off all of these boxes?   
CONCLUSION 
The categorical approach may seem to occupy only small part of First 
Amendment real estate. And it does only a limited amount of work. It is not 
a full-blown free speech theory. It says how we should decide a certain set 
of cases; it does not say why speech is valuable or not valuable. It just points 
to tradition—it leaves open why that tradition is valuable, if it is. But the 
categorical approach does represent a real doctrinal innovation, a sort of 
“back to the future” in First Amendment law. And the upshot is, as Magarian 
admits, surprisingly speech protective in Brown, Stevens, and Alvarez. It 
gives us the results that Magarian likes, if not for Magarian’s reasons—
although as I have argued, I am not sure Magarian’s reasons can get us to 
those results, or at least not as cleanly as the categorical approach can. 
There remains much work to be done on the categorical approach, both 
small and large. On the “small” front (and this is not really all that small), 
we do need to do the history to see if we’ve got the categories right.59 As 
Magarian notes, there is disagreement here, and at least in the terms of the 
                                                 
59. Important in this regard are two recent articles. See Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-
Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166 (2015); see also Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First 
Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246 (2017). Lakier’s article, in particular, may seem to buttress Magarian’s 
worries about tradition, although Campbell’s may present a more radical challenge to the idea that our 
tradition is generally speech-protective. Lakier suggests that the notion that some categories have a 
historical imprimatur is a mistake, an “invented tradition.” Lakier, supra note 59, at 2168. Looking at 
Lakier’s incredibly thought-provoking piece in depth is beyond the scope of this brief comment, but I 
will make two quick points: 1) it is not obvious that Lakier shows that all of the history beyond the 
categorical approach is wrong, only some of it, and 2) even so, Lakier’s critique may still only be what 
I have called, above, an “internal” critique: it does not suggest the turn to history is wrong in itself, but 
that (some parts of) the history has been done badly, even extremely badly. But we need a further 
argument to get from “we can’t tell the history reliably” to “we should go straight to balancing values in 














approach, that debate can only be decided by good history, not by a 
balancing of values. The historical turn in First Amendment law is coming, 
and to my mind, it is long overdue.  
On the “large” front, the categorical list seems to be somewhat at odds 
with another of the court’s major free-speech jurisprudence, the idea of the 
permissibility of “content-neutral” distinctions. The categorical approach 
seems to be all or nothing: either the speech in question is on the list, and 
the government can regulate it, or it is not, and the government cannot 
regulate it. But behind content-neutral regulation is the idea that the 
government can regulate speech so long as that regulation does not 
discriminate on the basis of the content of ideas, that this kind of regulation 
does not present any real Constitutional problem. Some articulations of the 
content-neutrality principle even seem to say that any regulation on the basis 
of content is absolutely prohibited.60 But this idea cannot be right, because 
of the tradition we have of regulating content, in particular, the content on 
the categorical list of exclusions.61 So there exists a tension here, and 
something has to give—but what? If we agree that some things on the 
categorical list are rightly on there (for tradition or any other reason), then 
we must reject the idea that content-based distinctions as such are ruled out. 
What implications this has for regulations that are not content-based, 
however, remains to be worked out.62 
                                                 
60. “But, above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Police Dep't of City of 
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (emphasis added).  
61. As Burger pointed out in his concurring opinion in Mosley. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 103 (Burger, 
J., concurring). 
62. It may suggest that the whole idea of permissible content-neutral regulations is no good. 
One’s speech is either on the list, or strict scrutiny applies. It may lead us to a sort of Justice Black-type 
absolutism. See Blocher, supra note 10, at 384 (describing Black’s categorical approach). In general, it 
is simply unclear what accepting the idea of categorical exclusions means for content-neutral regulation. 
We know what it means for additional categorical exclusions, though: unless you can show that history 
(as construed by the Court) supports it (and this seems very unlikely), there can be no new categories.  
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